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WHAT’S MINE IS MINE, BUT WHAT’S 
YOURS SHOULD ALSO BE MINE: AN 
ANALYSIS OF STATE STATUTES THAT 
MANDATE THE IMPLANTATION OF 
FROZEN PREEMBRYOS 
Diane K. Yang* 
INTRODUCTION 
In recent years, the advancements in reproductive technology 
have led to a surge in the number of couples seeking fertility 
treatments such as in vitro fertilization (“IVF”).1 IVF is one of 
many artificially assisted conception procedures available to 
infertile couples.2 In a country where one in every five couples is 
                                                          
 * Brooklyn Law School Class of 2003; B.A., Barnard College of 
Columbia University, 2000. The author would like to thank the following 
individuals: Professor Jennifer Rosato for her invaluable insight, comments 
and guidance; David Keusch for his helpful suggestions; her friends, Andrea 
Anderson, Annie Lam, Debbie Lee, and Belinda Leung, who offered their 
encouragement and support; the entire staff of the Journal of Law and Policy, 
especially her editors, Caroline Nadal and Sonia Robertson; and her mother 
for her unconditional love and extraordinary patience. 
1 The IVF procedure accounted for approximately 74% of the Assisted 
Reproductive Technologies (“ARTs”) used in 1999. Center for Disease 
Control and Prevention, 1999 Assisted Reproductive Technology Success 
Rates: National Summary and Fertility Clinic Reports, fig.2, available at 
http://www.cdc.gov/nccdphp/drh/ART99/index99.htm (last visited Apr. 28, 
2002). 
2 Although a vast majority of the cases involve disputes between couples 
who later separate, there have been instances where unmarried individuals 
have also sought the use of IVF to conceive children. See discussion infra note 
211 (discussing a criminal case where a bachelor hired a surrogate to undergo 
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infertile, the United States has emerged as a leader in disputes 
involving the custody of frozen preembryos3 created by artificial 
conception procedures.4 Currently, however, there are no federal 
statutes that provide a uniform consensus on resolving the 
disputes over the ownership of preembryos. In an effort to create 
predictability and eliminate confusion over future disposition of 
preembryos, several states5 have enacted legislation requiring 
specific treatment of preembryos in the event of death, 
separation, divorce of the commissioning couple, or any other 
unforeseen circumstances.6 
The different views regarding the status of preembryos have 
caused debate and unpredictability. The lack of direction from a 
                                                          
IVF with his sperm). 
3 Courts and commentators addressing this topic identify the fertilized egg 
at the developmental stage when cryopreservation takes place in different 
ways. Some courts, for example, use the term “pre-zygote,” while others use 
the term “preembryo.” See, e.g., J.B. v. M.B., 783 A.2d 707, 708 (N.J. 
2001) (noting that the term “preembryo” rather than “embryo” should be used 
when the ova are frozen); Kass v. Kass, 696 N.E.2d 174 (N.Y. 1998) (using 
the term “pre-zygote”). Furthermore, the New Jersey court found that because 
“[a] preembryo is a fertilized ovum up to approximately fourteen days old (the 
point when it implants in the uterus),” it uses that term in place of “embryo” 
because “preembryo is technically descriptive of the cells’ stage of 
development when they are cryopreserved (frozen).” J.B., 783 A.2d at 708 
n.1 (internal citation omitted). Since these terms are legally indistinguishable, 
the terms “pre-zygote,” “preembryo” and “fertilized egg” will be used 
interchangeably throughout this note. 
4 See Daniel I. Steinberg, Note, Divergent Conceptions: Procreational 
Rights and Disputes over the Fate of Frozen Embryos, 7 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 
315, 317 (1997). Other leaders in custody disputes include Israel and the 
United Kingdom. See, e.g., Helene S. Shapo, Frozen Pre-Embryos and the 
Right to Change One’s Mind, 12 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 75, 76-7 (2002) 
(finding that ART procedures are commonplace in these countries and briefly 
discussing the significant custody cases that arose in each locale). 
5 These states include Florida, Illinois, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, 
Missouri, New Hampshire, New Mexico, and Pennsylvania. See infra note 
158 (describing the restrictions in each state). 
6 David H. Fiestal, Note, A Solomonic Decision: What Will Be the Fate of 
Frozen Preembryos?, 6 CARDOZO WOMEN’S L.J. 103, 107-08 (1999) (noting 
that a few states have passed statutes to address the disposition of frozen 
preembryos). 
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majority of state legislatures forces socially vital issues such as 
one’s procreative freedom and the status of a preembryo to be 
decided and determined by judges who represent the opinions and 
morals of a select few rather than society at large.7 Although it is 
common in family law for judges to decide the legal direction and 
standards of particular problems,8 it is best for legislators, who 
represent the public, to decide the issues and impose uniformity 
in the law. Furthermore, judges have been forced to sift through 
an array of complicated factors pertaining to consent agreements, 
contracts, and other legal matters with little statutory guidance, 
creating a confusing and contradictory body of caselaw. With 
more than 100,000 frozen preembryos stored in IVF clinics 
throughout the country, a number growing at a rate of 18.8% 
annually,9 legislative guidance is needed. Couples attempting IVF 
are entitled to direction from the legislature prior to undergoing 
the procedure. The legislatures should enact statutes that 
thoroughly address the disposition of these preembryos in a way 
that ensures maximum procreative freedom. 
Although a few states have enacted specific statutes to deal 
with the issue of frozen preembryos, each differs widely as to the 
legal status of and rights attributed to these cells.10 Part I of this 
note provides an introduction to the IVF procedure and describes 
how frozen preembryos are created. Part II focuses on present 
caselaw and how the state courts have dealt with the issue of 
custody disputes. Part III describes and analyzes state legislative 
                                                          
7 See Barbara L. Shapiro, “Non-Traditional” Families in the Courts: The 
New Extended Family, 11 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIM. LAW. 117, 118 (1993) 
(noting that judges often voice their moral objections and fears of state 
intrusions in familial decisions). 
8 Id. 
9 See Lori B. Andrews & Nanette Elster, Regulating Reproductive 
Technologies, 21 J. LEGAL MED. 35, 59 (2000); see also Jackie Jadrnack, 
Legal Chill Surrounds Frozen Embryos, ALBUQUERQUE J., Apr. 1, 2001, 
available at 2001 WL 17938689 (stating that there are an estimated 100,000 to 
200,000 frozen preembryos being stored in fertility clinics throughout the 
country). 
10 See discussion infra Part III (discussing and comparing the Florida, 
Louisiana, and New Mexico statutes). 
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responses regarding the disposition of frozen preembryos and 
analyzes the scope of protection state laws provide and more 
importantly, the priorities of each law. It also argues that the 
Florida statute, which requires couples to determine the 
disposition of their preembryos in a signed agreement prior to 
IVF,11 is the best approach to this sensitive issue because it 
encourages participants to make conscious and thoughtful 
decisions. Although some may argue that such agreements 
defining familial relationships violate public policy, these 
agreements should nevertheless be encouraged because they 
ensure that parties will not be forced to accept outcomes they did 
not anticipate.12 Finally, this note concludes that state statutes are 
essential in providing guidance for the future of IVF programs, 
and it proposes a revised version of Florida’s statute mandating 
disposition agreements. Ultimately, this note predicts that as use 
of IVF and other assisted reproductive procedures increase in 
popularity, the potential for debate and controversy will also 
intensify. Thus, the state legislatures should take a pro-active 
position to determine the future of IVF programs, maximize 
individual procreative rights, and establish predictability for 
future IVF participants. 
I. IN VITRO FERTILIZATION AND THE CREATION OF EXCESS 
PREEMBRYOS 
In the United States, approximately 6.1 million people,13 or 
about 10% of the population that is of reproductive age, are 
                                                          
11 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 742.17 (West 2001) (requiring the commissioning 
couple and the treating physician to enter into a written agreement that 
provides for the disposition of the cells). 
12 See supra note 7 (noting that since judges voice their objections to state 
intrusions, this creates ambiguity as to what the court might do if a custody 
case over preembryos should come before the court). 
13 American Society for Reproductive Medicine, ASRM: Frequently 
Asked Questions About Infertility, available at  
http://www.asrm.org/Patients/faqs.html (last visited Apr. 28, 2002) 
[hereinafter ASRM: Frequently Asked Questions]. 
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affected by infertility.14 Since 1978, when the first child 
conceived by IVF was born,15 the use of artificial reproductive 
technologies (“ARTs”) has grown into a largely unregulated, 
billion-dollar industry.16 More than 45,000 American babies have 
been conceived through IVF since its introduction in the United 
States.17 
IVF begins with administering fertility drugs to the woman to 
stimulate egg production.18 The eggs are extracted from her 
ovaries and placed in a petri dish to be combined with sperm to 
fertilize the egg.19 Once fertilization has taken place, the cell 
begins to divide.20 After the preembryo reaches the four-to-eight 
cell stage, it is transferred into the woman’s uterus.21 Following 
the development of cryopreservation22 in 1981,23 physicians have 
been able to obtain more eggs with one extraction procedure and 
can now create and store extra preembryos.24 Because only about 
one in every four preembryos implanted results in a successful 
pregnancy,25 the unavoidable result of IVF is the creation of extra 
                                                          
14 Infertility is defined as “the failure of a couple to conceive after one 
year of intercourse without using contraception.” Id. 
15 Thomas D. Arado, Note, Frozen Embryos and Divorce: Technological 
Marvel Meets the Human Condition, 21 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 241, 241 (2001). 
16 LORI B. ANDREWS, THE CLONE AGE 48 (1999). 
17 ASRM: Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 13. 
18 See Machelle M. Seibel, A New Era in Reproductive Technology In 
Vitro Fertilization, Gamete Intrafallopian Transfer and Donated Gametes and 
Embryos, 318 NEW ENG. J. MED. 828, 829 (1988). 
19 See id. 
20 See id. 
21 See id. 
22 Cryopreservation is the freezing of preembryos in liquid nitrogen at 
either the two-, four- or eight-cell stage of development. Arado, supra note 
15, at 244 (citing Marcia J. Wurmbrand, Note, Frozen Embryos: Moral, 
Social, and Legal Implications, 59 S. CAL. L. REV. 1079, 1083 (1986)). 
23 Andrea M. Siegel, Comment, Legal Resolution to the Frozen Embryo 
Dilemma, 4 J. PHARMACY & L. 43, 46 (1995). 
24 Id. 
25 Center for Disease Control and Prevention, 1999 Assisted 
Reproductive Technology Success Rates: National Summary and Fertility 
Clinic Reports, Introduction to the 1999 National Report, available at 
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preembryos. These surpluses are cryopreserved to ensure that 
there are enough preembryos for use in future implantation.26 
Since human eggs cannot be frozen independently and still 
remain viable,27 many cryopreserved cells exist as either frozen 
preembryos or as sperm. While eggs can only be frozen for a 
short time,28 preembryos and sperm can be stored indefinitely.29 
There are primarily three different views attributed to 
preembryos and these various beliefs fuel the controversies over 
frozen cells. One group believes that preembryos constitute life; 
others believe that preembryos are the property of the people 
who supplied the gametes; and another group would give them a 
special interim status. Some argue that the party who wishes to 
use the preembryos should be given sole control of the cells,30 
and others think that the party who wishes to avoid procreation 
should prevail.31 
                                                          
http://apps.nccd.cdc.gov/ART99/nation99.asp (last visited Apr. 28, 2002). 
26 The average number of embryos transferred into a uterus before 
pregnancy is 3.1 embryos per procedure with only about 21.7% of such 
pregnancies resulting in live births. See id. 
27 See Katheleen R. Guzman, Property, Progeny, Body Part: Assisted 
Reproduction and the Transfer of Wealth, 31 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 193, 219 
(1997). Scientists currently believe that oocyte freezing and thawing, the 
process where the cells are cryopreserved and later defrosted in preparation 
for an IVF procedure, are the most difficult feats of reproductive technology 
to complete successfully because of the delicacy of the egg’s chromosomes. 
Unlike sperm, the egg’s chromosomes are less resilient and unlikely to replace 
the procedure of embryo freezing. Id. at 219 n.93. 
28 Id. 
29 Id. 
30 See, e.g., Jill Melchoir, Comment, Cryogenically Preserved Embryos 
in Dispositional Disputes and the Supreme Court: Breaking Impossible Ties, 
68 U. CIN. L. REV. 921, 924 (2000) (arguing that the intentional creation of 
embryos strongly implies a contract to procreate); Alise R. Panitch, Note, The 
Davis Dilemma: How to Prevent Battles over Frozen Preembryos, 41 CASE W. 
RES. L. REV. 543, 545 (1991) (arguing that the law should respect the special 
status of preembryos and that the appropriate outcome should always be in 
favor of the spouse who decides to implant). 
31 See, e.g., Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 604 (Tenn. 1992) (finding 
that “the party wishing to avoid procreation should prevail, assuming that the 
other party has a reasonable possibility of achieving parenthood by means 
YANGMACRO4-29.DOC 7/16/02  2:33 PM 
 FROZEN PREEMBRYO STATUTES 593 
A. The “Preembryo as Person” Viewpoint 
Those who view preembryos as persons argue that “a 
person’s unique genetic makeup is complete as soon as that 
person is conceived”; and, therefore, they object to the 
intentional destruction of fertilized eggs.32 They adopt a “parens 
patriae” viewpoint using the “best interest of the child” inquiry.33 
Louisiana and New Mexico, adopting this view, have enacted 
perhaps the most restrictive and controversial statutes. Both states 
mandate the implantation of excess preembryos by either the 
gamete providers or by a surrogate couple.34 Louisiana’s statute 
                                                          
other than use of the preembryos in question”); Michelle F. Sublett, Note, 
Frozen Embryos: What Are They and How Should the Law Treat Them, 38 
CLEV. ST. L. REV. 585, 616 (1990) (arguing that should a dispute between the 
gamete providers occur, there should be a presumption in favor of letting the 
preembryo expire over a gamete provider’s wish to bring the embryo to life 
since no human life has developed). 
32 Carl H. Coleman, Procreative Liberty and Contemporaneous Choice: 
An Inalienable Rights Approach to Frozen Embryo Disputes, 84 MINN. L. 
REV. 55, 66 (1999). See, e.g., Davis v. Davis, No. E-14496, 1989 WL 
140495, at *9 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 21, 1989) (holding that human life begins 
at conception rather than at implantation). 
33 Parens patriae is “[a] doctrine by which a government has standing to 
prosecute a lawsuit on behalf of a citizen, esp[ecially] on behalf of someone 
who is under a legal disability to prosecute the suit.” BLACK’S LAW 
DICTIONARY 1137 (7th ed. 1999). 
34 See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:129 (West 2001) (finding that a 
human preembryo is a juridical person and shall not be intentionally destroyed 
by anyone including its gamete providers and fertility clinic that generated its 
existence); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 24-9A-[1][g] (Michie 2001) (defining a 
“fetus” as the product of conception until birth), [3][a] (stating that a fetus 
cannot be subject to any activity that places it at risk unless the activity is for 
the health needs of that particular fetus and the fetus is minimally placed at 
such risk). 
 Although the New Mexico statute is similar to that of Louisiana because it 
also requires the implantation of preembryos, New Mexico has not gone as far 
as to define them as persons with separate individual rights. The problem with 
both states’ implantation requirement is that they deprive the procreative rights 
of IVF participants without a sufficient state interest. See Kramer v. Union 
Free Dist., 395 U.S. 621, 627 (1969) (holding that limiting fundamental rights 
can only be justified by a compelling state interest). 
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regarding IVF and the status of preembryos is the most 
comprehensive, but it is also the most questionable as to whether 
it will pass constitutional scrutiny.35 Currently, Louisiana is the 
only state that defines a preembryo as a “juridical person,”36 and 
as a separate legal entity37 that can “sue or be sued.”38 Under this 
statute, the preembryo is not the property of its progenitors, IVF 
physicians, or clinical facilities that generates or maintains its 
existence.39 Instead, if the donors of the sperm and egg renounce 
their parental rights to the preembryo for in-utero implantation, 
the preembryo must be made available for adoption.40 
There is academic support for the view that a preembryo 
should be given the rights of a person because, under this view, 
the preembryo is a human life.41 Supporters of this belief would 
give a preembryo all the rights and privileges of a human being 
from the moment of conception.42 They believe that a preembryo 
should be considered a life because it is a grouping of living 
                                                          
 Second, the requirement of implantation prioritizes legislative intent over 
medical concerns as to the best interest of the patients since the statutes do not 
provide for medical exceptions when a physician would ordinarily refrain from 
implanting more embryos than necessary because of the patient’s own physical 
condition. See generally N.M. STAT. ANN. § 24-9A-[1]-[7] (Michie 2001). 
See also KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 311.715 (Banks-Baldwin 2001) (stating that 
publicly funded IVF programs cannot conduct procedures that would 
intentionally destroy the embryo). 
35 See generally LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 9:124–130. 
36 See, e.g., § 9:123. 
37 See, e.g., § 9:125. 
38 See, e.g., § 9:124. 
39 See, e.g., § 9:126. 
40 See id. 
41 Symposium, Pushing the Boundaries: An Interdisciplinary Examination 
of the New Reproductive Technology, 45 LOY. L. REV. 239, 240-41 (1999) 
(noting that the fertilized cell is a “germinated genetic embodiment of a novel 
human life. The newly united cell, or zygote, is a fertilized human ovum and 
has the potential to develop into a human person.”). 
42 John A. Robertson, Embryos, Families, and Procreative Liberty: The 
Legal Structure of the New Reproduction, 59 S. CAL. L. REV. 942, 971 
(1986). 
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cells, forming the basic units of human life.43 They further argue 
that a preembryo has the same rights of a living being because its 
conception resulted from an intentional act to reproduce.44 In 
addition, they claim that scientific evidence supports this view,45 
that if allowed to develop, a preembryo may become a human 
life.46 
This argument, however, is extreme. Preembryos and 
embryos are lost naturally each day.47 Such occurrences are not 
contemplated as a loss of life, but rather a loss of genetic cells.48 
Many opponents argue further that the loss of cells “should not 
change merely because the loss occurs through the IVF 
process.”49 They contend that certain legalized birth control 
methods, such as “morning after” pills50 and intrauterine devices 
(“IUDs”),51 essentially cause the same loss of embryos by 
                                                          
43 David G. Dickman, Comment, Social Values in a Brave New World: 
Toward a Public Policy Regarding Embryo Status and In-Vitro Fertilization, 
29 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 817, 830 (1985). 
44 Id. 
45 Id. 
46 Id. 
47 Kim Schaefer, Comment, In Vitro Fertilization, Frozen Embryos and 
the Right to Privacy—Are Mandatory Donation Laws Constitutional?, 22 PAC. 
L.J. 87, 95 (1990). Seven days after fertilization, the preembryo is implanted 
in the uterus; this is the stage where many preembryos are lost. See R. Alta 
Charo, The Hunting of the Snark: The Moral Status of Embryos, Right-to-
Lifers, and Third World Women, 6 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 11, 15 (1995) (“A 
successful pregnancy depends on establishing a strong interaction between the 
[pre]embryos and the tissues of the womb.”). 
48 Id. 
49 Id. 
50 These pills, which require a prescription, prevent pregnancies by 
stopping ovulation, fertilization, or implantation of a fertilized egg in the 
uterus. See Jim Ritter, Having Pill Around Could Reduce Pregnancies 
Morning-After Drug Should Be Prescribed in Advance, Group Says, CHIC. 
SUN-TIMES, May 1, 2001, available at 2001 WL 7229028. 
51 Scientists are still unclear as to how IUDs work to prevent pregnancy, 
but some believe that they produce macrophages, white blood cells that 
destroy sperm. See Contraception: Medical School to Test New IUD 
Contraceptive, DRUG WEEK, Jan. 19, 2001, available at 2001 WL 17573310. 
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preventing its attachment to the uterine wall.52 While there are 
other legalized methods to destroy preembryos, it follows that 
preembryos created through IVF are no different and thus, are 
not and should not be afforded similar legal protections as a 
human life. 
B. Frozen Preembryos Invoke a “Special Interim Status” 
Many people agree that preembryos exist in an uncertain legal 
status. They are cells that do not enjoy protection as “persons” 
under federal law,53 but cannot be considered property because of 
their potential to become life. As a result of this potential, many 
scholars view preembryos as deserving a special status.54 To 
these scholars any other legal treatment or categorization—such 
as deeming them as “property”—would offend morals and 
ethics.55 Some courts have also accepted this viewpoint. In Davis 
v. Davis,56 for example, the Tennessee Supreme Court held that 
preembryos were neither property nor life, but rather occupied a 
“special interim status.”57 
                                                          
52 Schaefer, supra note 47, at 95. 
53 See also Jennifer M. Dehmel, Note, To Have or Not to Have: Whose 
Procreative Rights Prevail in Disputes over Dispositions of Frozen Embryos?, 
27 CONN. L. REV. 1377, 1383 (1995) (“In Roe v. Wade, the United States 
Supreme Court interpreted the word ‘person’ as used in the Fourteenth 
Amendment to exclude the unborn. Although ‘person’ is not defined in the 
Constitution, the Court held that ‘use of the word is such that it has application 
only postnatally.’”). 
54 See Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 588 (Tenn. 1992) 
(acknowledging that even the American Fertility Society, an organization of 
over 10,000 physicians and specialists working with problems of infertility, 
has categorized embryos as occupying an interim status group). See also 
Jennifer L. Carlow, Note, Davis v. Davis: An Inconsistent Exception to an 
Otherwise Sound Rule Advancing Freedom and Reproductive Technology, 43 
DEPAUL L. REV. 523, 526 (1994). 
55 See John A. Robertson, In the Beginning: The Legal Status of Early 
Embryos, 76 VA. L. REV. 437, 447 (1990). 
56 842 S.W.2d at 594-98; see also infra Part II.A (discussing the specific 
facts and holding of the case). 
57 842 S.W.2d at 597 (“We conclude that preembryos are not, strictly 
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Professor John Robertson supports the view of providing 
special status for preembryos and advocates the use of contract 
theory to resolve custody disputes.58 As a leading defender of the 
use of contracts, he argues that they provide the only way to 
adequately protect a couple’s interest in procreative autonomy.59 
He claims that enforceable contracts will minimize potential 
disputes and create more efficient IVF programs because of their 
ability to establish certainty and predictability as to the 
disposition of preembryos.60 Professor Robertson recognizes that 
these agreements give both parties the opportunity to decide and 
determine their reproductive future.61 By equating advance 
agreements with living wills62 and donor cards,63 he concludes 
that such directives are permissible.64 Moreover, he argues that 
they protect “one’s current interests and autonomy . . . [by] 
                                                          
speaking, either ‘persons’ or ‘property,’ but occupy an interim category that 
entitles them to special respect because of their potential for human life.”). 
58 Professor of Law, University of Texas at Austin. Faculty Profiles, 
University of Texas, School of Law, available at http://www.utexas.edu/ 
law/faculty/jrobertson (last visited Apr. 28, 2002). Professor Robertson has 
written numerous articles and books on bioethical issues and is currently Chair 
of the Ethics Committee of the American Society for Reproductive Medicine. 
Id. 
59 John A. Robertson, Prior Agreements for Disposition of Frozen 
Embryos, 51 OHIO ST. L.J. 407, 414 (1990). Furthermore, Robertson states 
that “[c]lear rules for disposition of embryos is [sic] necessary to meet the 
needs of infertile couples, to minimize disputes, and to facilitate efficient IVF 
program operation.” Id. at 409. 
60 Id. 
61 Id. 
62 Id. at 415 n.29. A living will is defined as follows: 
  An instrument, signed with the formalities necessary for a will, by 
which a person states the intention to refuse medical treatment and to 
release healthcare providers from all liability if the person becomes 
both terminally ill and unable to communicate such a refusal. 
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 945-46 (7th ed. 1999). 
63 Robertson, supra note 59, at 415 n.28. He also argues that the use of 
prior agreements for preembryos is similar to the use of living wills and donor 
cards in that one’s current interests and autonomy may be served by the ability 
to direct future events when the person is no longer able to decide. Id. 
64 Id. at 415. 
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direct[ing] future events when the person is unable or unavailable 
to decide.”65 
The recognition and enforcement of these contracts 
maximizes procreative liberty because the outcome is based on 
the mutual consent and control of both parents.66 Without such 
authority, procreative rights are infringed because the “decisions 
about [the pre]embryos will be made by others in ways that might 
insufficiently value the reproductive concerns of the persons 
involved.”67 If the prior agreement is not binding, the IVF 
program, the court, or the legislature will determine the 
disposition of the frozen preembryos.68 This may result in a 
disposition contrary to the parents’ intent and thus, interfere with 
procreative interests.69 In his view, couples will only be able to 
rely on such agreements for the future disposition of their 
preembryos with universal acceptance of such agreements. 
Professor Carl Coleman is perhaps one of the strongest 
opponents to the idea of creating contractual obligations to 
determine the disposition of frozen preembryos.70 He expressly 
rejects the constitutionality of such agreements,71 arguing that 
contracts violate inalienable rights inherent to all individuals, 
such as the right to procreate freely.72 He claims that an 
agreement restricts a couple’s choice because the terms of the 
contract, although once agreed upon, may no longer reflect the 
                                                          
65 Id. at n.28. 
66 Id. 
67 Id. at 415. 
68 Id. at n.28. 
69 Id. at 415. 
70 Professor Coleman was formerly the Executive Director of the New 
York State Task Force on Life and the Law, a nationally recognized 
interdisciplinary commission. He has served on numerous governmental and 
bar association committees. He currently chairs the Special Committee on 
Treatment Decisions of the New York State Bar Association’s Health Law 
Section and is an Associate Director of the Health Law and Policy Program at 
Seton Hall. Biography, Seton Hall Law On-Line, available at 
http://law.shu.edu/faculty/fulltime_faculty/colemaca/coleman.htm (last visited 
Apr. 28, 2002). 
71 Coleman, supra note 32, at 56, 88-90. 
72 Id. at 57. 
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couple’s present intent or desire.73 He further argues that the 
decision to procreate or avoid procreation is such a significant 
fundamental right that only upon the mutual consent of both 
parties should a preembryo be either carried to term or 
destroyed.74 
C. Frozen Preembryos as Property Viewpoint 
Those who consider preembryos as matrimonial assets or 
“property,” equate preembryos as the personal property of their 
gamete providers.75 Under this reasoning, preembryos can be 
treated just as any other asset and thereby can be owned, 
destroyed, gifted, or donated.76 Supporters of this viewpoint 
place the desires and interests of the gamete providers above that 
of the preembryo.77 Although this idea has existed for quite some 
time, many jurisdictions have been hesitant to define preembryos 
as property. 78 
One of the most popular theories that supports the view of 
preembryos as property is the “sweat equity” rule.79 The idea is 
                                                          
73 Id. at 126. 
74 Id. at 82. 
75 Guzman, supra note 27, at 207. 
76 Id. 
77 Id. 
78 See, e.g., Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 596 (Tenn. 1992) (refusing 
to define the status of preembryos as anything more than interim); but see 
York v. Jones, 717 F. Supp. 421 (E.D.Va. 1989) (holding that preembryos 
are the property of their gamete providers for purposes of a cryopreservation 
agreement). 
79 Paula Walter, His, Hers, or Theirs—Custody, Control and Contracts: 
Allocating Decisional Authority over Frozen Embryos, 29 SETON HALL L. 
REV. 937, 962 (1999). This approach favors women by resting on the 
assumption that procreative rights, by their very biological nature, cannot be 
equal between both genders. See generally Lori B. Andrews, The Legal Status 
of Embryos, 32 LOY. L. REV. 357, 406 (1986); Judith Daar, Panel on 
Disputes Concerning Frozen Embryos, 8 TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 285, 293 
(1999); John A. Robertson, Resolving Disputes over Frozen Embryos, 19 
HASTINGS CTR. REP. 7 (1989); Tanya Feliciano, Note, Davis v. Davis: What 
About Future Disputes?, 26 CONN. L. REV. 305, 348 (1993). 
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that a woman should have sole decision-making authority with 
respect to the fate of her preembryos.80 In numerous articles and 
publications, scholars have recognized the argument that a 
woman retains this decision-making right.81 By extending the 
holding of Roe v. Wade,82 these scholars argue that since a 
woman has the right to choose if and when to abort a pregnancy, 
she should have the same freedom to control her frozen 
preembryos.83 Applying this reasoning, a frozen preembryo 
artificially sustained in liquid nitrogen is no different from a fetus 
in the womb; therefore, the woman should retain the right to 
determine its fate.84 Regardless of whether the father wishes to 
procreate or avoid procreation, the woman retains ultimate 
decision-making authority.85 Although this theory has 
supporters,86 the reasoning is questionable and is subject to 
criticism. 
There are several flaws with the “sweat equity” argument. 
First, although Roe v. Wade recognized the negative impact upon 
a woman if she were forced to choose between carrying an 
                                                          
80 See Andrews, supra note 79, at 406. Those who favor this idea claim 
that during IVF, women endure a physically and emotionally invasive 
procedure, while men merely surrender sperm, a relatively simple and easy 
task. Id. Since women undergo a more painful and difficult procedure, they 
should be granted with the decision-making rights. Id. 
81 See generally supra note 79 (noting the various scholars who have 
written about a woman’s right to make the decision regarding the disposition 
of her preembryos). See also Marcia J. Wurmbrand, Note, Frozen Embryos: 
Moral, Social, and Legal Implications, 59 S. CAL. L. REV. 1079, 1095-96 
(1986) (noting that there are scholars who believe that a woman’s interest in 
privacy, bodily autonomy, and limiting lineal descendants would entitle her to 
dispose of her preembryos as she deems fit). 
82 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (holding that the expansion of 
privacy rights would cover the right of a woman to have an abortion). 
83 Andrews, supra note 79, at 406. 
84 Proponents of the “sweat equity” rule support a woman’s right to 
decide the fate of preembryos because it is through her that preembryos are 
formed. Thus, it is assumed that supporters would also view frozen 
preembryos as no different from fetuses. See id. 
85 Id. 
86 Id. 
YANGMACRO4-29.DOC 7/16/02  2:33 PM 
 FROZEN PREEMBRYO STATUTES 601 
unwanted pregnancy or entering into motherhood,87 its holding 
legalizing abortion was based on the fundamental right of 
privacy.88 Frozen preembryos, stored in a clinic are significantly 
different from a fetus sustained within the womb; thus, the 
principles behind Roe are not triggered.89 Unlike in Roe, there is 
no privacy interest because there is no burden or interference 
with the woman’s body or personal autonomy.90 Moreover, the 
legal status of a preembryo differs greatly depending on whether 
it is in the womb or in a frozen state.91 While there are criminal 
statutes to protect fetuses in the womb from intentional abortions 
by a third party,92 it is not a criminal offense to accidentally or 
intentionally destroy a preembryo outside of the uterus.93 A 
                                                          
87 Roe, 410 U.S. at 153. 
88 Id. at 154 (stating that “the right of personal privacy includes the 
abortion decision, but . . . this right is not unqualified and must be considered 
against important state interests in regulation”). 
89 Id. at 153. In Roe, the Court recognized various psychological, mental, 
and physical burdens on a woman if the state forced her into unwanted 
motherhood. Id. All of these factors pertain to a woman’s bodily autonomy. 
Thus, frozen preembryos would not violate the privacy principles defined in 
Roe since these cells are removed from the woman’s body. 
90 See Radhika Rao, Constitutional Misconceptions, 93 MICH. L. REV. 
1473, 1479 (1995). 
91 Melchoir, supra note 30, at 950 (noting that a frozen preembryo exists 
outside of the womb and since the bodily integrity of the woman is not 
violated, state laws can prohibit its destruction where it otherwise could not if 
the preembryo was attached to a uterine wall). 
92 See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 782.09 (West 2001) (stating that “[t]he 
willful killing of an unborn quick child, by any injury to the mother of such 
child which would be murder if it resulted in the death of such mother”); ILL. 
COMP. STAT. 720 ILCS 5/9-1.2(3)(b) (West 2001) (providing that it is a crime 
to kill any individual of the human species from fertilization until birth other 
than by a lawful abortion); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:32.5 (West 2001) 
(providing that feticide is the killing of an unborn child); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 
30-5-3 (Michie 2001) (providing that a criminal abortion is any act, not 
justified as a medical termination, that ends a woman’s pregnancy); N.Y. 
PENAL LAW § 125.00 (Consol. 2001) (defining homicide as any conduct that 
causes the death of a person or an unborn child who is more than twenty-four 
weeks from the moment of conception). 
93 Currently, there are no statutes that impose criminal sanctions on a 
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couple, therefore, can sue for monetary damages for the 
destruction of their preembryos,94 but a physician who destroys a 
preembryo could not be charged with murder. 
Another flaw in the “sweat equity” theory is that under it 
men and women are not afforded equal rights. Even though Roe 
gives women the right to control the procreative process with 
respect to traditional pregnancies, the decision does not vest 
greater rights to women than men.95 Instead, “Roe and its 
progeny are cited for the principle that the right to procreate and 
the right not to procreate are independent rights, each equally 
protected in the interest of either gender.”96 Because the statuses 
of fetuses and preembryos are not equivalent under the law, the 
interest in the fate of the preembryo is the same among both 
gamete providers, man and woman. Neither party, therefore, 
should gain sole control over the preembryos on the basis of sex 
alone, as supporters of the “sweat equity” theory would argue. 
Just from these few viewpoints, it is evident that the status of the 
preembryo remains unclear. 
II. BACKGROUND OF CASELAW 
Cases with unforeseen circumstances, where the interested 
                                                          
person who destroys an embryo. Although there are criminal sanctions for 
intentional feticide, many of these jurisdictions define a fetus, for the purposes 
of imposing criminal charges, as those beings that have reached a specific 
point of development. See supra note 92. 
94 See, e.g., Del Zio v. Presbyterian Hosp., 1978 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
14450, at **3-6 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 14, 1978). In this case, the couple’s 
physician, believing that Mrs. Del Zio could not reproduce naturally, 
suggested that the couple attempt conception by IVF, a relatively new and 
experimental treatment at the time. Id. at **2-3. The chairman of obstetrics 
and gynecology, however, learned of the experimental procedure within his 
department and ordered the culture destroyed. Id. at *3. The plaintiffs filed 
suit for both conversion and intentional infliction of emotional distress. Id. at 
*4. The jury awarded the plaintiffs $50,000 in damages for the second claim 
only. Id. at *11. 
95 Walter, supra note 79, at 962; see also Andrews, supra note 79, at 
407. 
96 Walter, supra note 79, at 962. 
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parties have not made any agreements as to the disposition of 
their preembryos, such as when death or divorce occurs, have 
become increasingly problematic. Although there have been 
precedent-setting cases involving disputes over the disposition of 
these preembryos in states such as Tennessee,97 New York98 and 
New Jersey,99 state legislatures should provide the courts with 
greater guidance in this area.100 Today judges rather than the 
gamete providers are deciding matters pertaining to procreational 
rights. 
A. Davis v. Davis: Supreme Court of Tennessee, 1992 
Davis v. Davis was the first major case decided by a state’s 
highest court with regard to the custody of preembryos.101 In 
Davis, the Tennessee Supreme Court agreed with the appellate 
court that there is a constitutional right to avoid procreation when 
no pregnancy has taken place.102 The Davises could not procreate 
naturally and attempted six IVF procedures, none of which led to 
                                                          
97 See, e.g., Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588 (Tenn. 1992) (holding that 
there is an equal right to both procreate and avoid procreation and that the 
interests of each party must be weighed). 
98 See, e.g., Kass v. Kass, 696 N.E.2d 174 (N.Y. 1998) (upholding the 
validity of predisposition agreements upon the divorce of the progenitors). 
99 See, e.g., J.B. v. M.B., 783 A.2d 707 (N.J. 2001) (holding that even if 
the husband and wife in this case had entered into an unambiguous agreement 
regarding the disposition of their frozen preembryos, because it is against 
public policy, the court will not enforce an agreement that would compel one 
donor to become a parent against his or her will). 
100 See infra Part III (discussing the different legislation regulating IVF). 
101 Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 589. 
102 Id. at 589, 590, 601. The Tennessee Supreme Court stated that it 
granted review of the case not because it disagreed with the basic legal 
analysis utilized by the intermediate court, but because the issue was of great 
importance. Id. at 590. The court went on to hold that there is a fundamental 
right to privacy so that “no other person or entity has an interest sufficient to 
permit interference with the gamete-providers’ decision to continue or 
terminate the IVF process, because no one else bears the consequences of 
these decisions in the way that the gamete-providers do.” Id. at 602. 
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a pregnancy.103 As a result, seven extra frozen preembryos were 
created.104 When the Davis marriage dissolved, the couple could 
not agree on the disposition of the preembryos.105 The parties had 
not executed a prior written agreement to govern the disposition 
of the preembryos in the event of divorce.106 While Mary Sue 
Davis wanted to either retain the preembryos for her own use or 
donate them to a childless couple, Junior Davis vehemently 
opposed fathering a child and having it raised by others.107 
Concluding that the preembryos were “human beings,”108 the trial 
court gave custody to Mary Sue for the purpose of carrying them 
to term through implantation.109 The appellate court reversed the 
decision, finding that the husband’s interest in avoiding 
procreation was constitutionally protected and that there was no 
compelling state interest to justify the transfer against the will of 
Junior Davis.110 Although the Tennessee Supreme Court agreed 
with the intermediate court’s decision of avoiding forced 
procreation, it disagreed with its legal analysis and created a new 
legal framework to provide guidance in this area.111 
The Tennessee Supreme Court refused to define a preembryo 
                                                          
103 Id. at 591. 
104 Id. at 589. 
105 Id. 
106 Id. at 590. 
107 Initially, Mary Sue Davis wanted the preembryos for another IVF 
procedure to become pregnant. Id. at 589-90. However, at the time the case 
was before the Tennessee Supreme Court, she had remarried and wanted the 
authority to donate the preembryos to a childless couple. Id. 
108 Id. at 589 (stating that the trial court defined the preembryos as human 
beings “from the moment of fertilization”). 
109 Id. 
110 Davis v. Davis, No. E-14496, 1990 WL 130807, at *3 (Tenn. Ct. 
App. Sept. 13, 1990) (stating that “[i]t would be . . . repugnant to order [the 
husband] to bear the psychological, if not the legal, consequences of paternity 
against his will”). 
111 Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 590 (stating that review was granted because of 
the importance of the case in developing new law regarding reproductive 
technologies, and because the decision of the intermediate court “[did] not 
give adequate guidance to the trial court in the event the parties cannot 
agree”). 
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as either property under the sole control and disposition of its 
progenitors,112 or as a person who is afforded separate legal 
interests.113 Instead, the court decided that a preembryo occupied 
an interim level status in which it is entitled to special respect due 
to its potential for life.114 Holding that preembryos lacked the 
same legal protections afforded to fetuses,115 the court found that, 
as a matter of law, progenitors should have primary decision-
making authority regarding their preembryos.116 The court 
determined that the right of procreational autonomy is composed 
of two equal rights: the right to procreate and the right to avoid 
procreation.117 The court further held that “[a]n interest in 
avoiding genetic parenthood can be significant enough to trigger 
the protections afforded to all other aspects of parenthood.”118 
The court concluded that because Mary Sue ultimately did not 
want to use the preembryos herself, Junior’s right to avoid 
procreation outweighed her wish to have the cells donated.119 If 
Mary Sue had desired to use the preembryos herself, however, 
                                                          
112 Id. at 596 (holding that a preembryo is not “property” since it has the 
“potential for developing into independent human life, even if it is not yet 
legally recognizable as human life itself”). 
113 Id. at 595 (pointing out that the legality of abortion indicates that while 
preembryos “are accorded more respect than mere human cells because of 
their burgeoning potential for life . . . they are not given legal status 
equivalent to that of a person already born [even though they may have 
reached viability]”). 
114 Id. at 597 (stating that “preembryos are not, strictly speaking, either 
‘persons’ or ‘property,’ but occupy an interim category that entitles them to 
special respect because of their potential for human life”). 
115 Id. at 596-97. To further emphasize the difference between 
preembryos and fetuses, the court pointed out that while “[l]eft undisturbed, a 
viable fetus has an excellent chance of being brought to term and born 
live . . . a preembryo in a petri dish, [even if] later transferred, has only a 13-
21 percent chance of achieving implantation.” Id. at 595 n.19. 
116 Id. at 597. 
117 Id. at 601. 
118 Id. at 603 (citing that the courts have previously addressed abortion 
cases, which deal with the question of gestational parenthood, as well as 
questions pertaining to child-bearing and child-rearing aspects of parenthood). 
119 Id. at 604. 
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the court would then have considered whether she could have 
biological children through alternate means.120 
Although the couple did not execute a prior written agreement 
as to the disposition of the preembryos upon divorce, the court 
nevertheless presumed such agreements to be valid and 
enforceable.121 The court found that if the initial contract could be 
later modified by mutual accord,122 these agreements would 
protect parties against unconscionable risks.123 Furthermore, 
enforcement of such agreements would ensure that the 
progenitors retain authority over the disposition of their 
preembryos.124 The Davis decision was remarkable not only 
because it was the first case to address this issue,125 but also 
because the court in Davis thoughtfully set forth an analytical 
framework for determining the status and fate of frozen 
preembryos. 
                                                          
120 Id. (holding that such other means can include attempts at IVF or 
adoption). 
121 Id. at 597 (stating that the conclusion that agreements should be 
enforced is premised on “the proposition that the progenitors, having provided 
the gametic material giving rise to the preembryos, retain decision-making 
authority as to their disposition”). 
122 Id. 
123 Id. The court recognized that infertile couples are highly emotional: 
[T]he parties’ initial “informed consent” to IVF procedures will often 
not be truly informed because of near impossibility of anticipating, 
emotionally and psychologically, all the turns that events may take as 
the IVF process unfolds. Providing that the initial agreement may 
later be modified by agreement will . . . protect the parties 
against . . . the risks they face in this regard. 
Id. 
124 Id. 
125 Davis was the first major case to reach a state’s highest court and to 
address the problems that arise with frozen preembryo disposition. Although 
the couple in the case did not execute a prior written agreement as to the 
disposition upon divorce, the court suggested that an agreement could be 
sustained so long as it could be modified by mutual accord in the future. Id. at 
597, 604. 
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B. Kass v. Kass: Court of Appeals of New York, 1998 
Six years after the Davis decision, the New York Court of 
Appeals supported the validity of predisposition contracts in Kass 
v. Kass.126 Like Davis, Kass involved a dispute between a 
divorcing couple over their frozen preembryos. The wife wanted 
to use the preembryos after the divorce to become pregnant.127 
The husband, citing to a consent form the parties signed before 
the IVF procedure,128 claimed that the couple had agreed to 
donate the preembryos for scientific research.129 
The court unanimously held that the consent form signed by 
both parties demonstrated the couple’s intent to donate the excess 
preembryos to scientific research, and therefore, the agreement 
should be enforced.130 Furthermore, it held that agreements in 
                                                          
126 696 N.E.2d 174 (N.Y. 1998) (holding that predisposition agreements 
upon the divorce of the progenitors are valid). 
127 Id. at 177. 
128 Id. at 176. The couple underwent numerous IVF attempts and signed 
the consent agreement right before the final procedure. Id. The second part, 
entitled “INFORMED CONSENT FORM NO. 2 ADDENDUM NO. 2-1: 
CRYOPRESERVATION-STATEMENT OF DISPOSITION,” stated the 
following: 
We understand that it is IVF Program Policy to obtain our informed 
consent to the number of pre-zygotes which are to be cryopreserved 
and to the disposition of excess cryopreserved pre-zygotes. We are to 
indicate our choices by signing our initials where noted below. 
1. We consent to cryopreservation of all pre-zygotes which are not 
transferred during this IVF cycle for possible use by us in a future 
IVF cycle. 
2. In the event that we no longer wish to initiate a pregnancy or are 
unable to make a decision regarding the disposition of our stored, 
frozen pre-zygotes, we now indicate our desire for the disposition of 
our pre-zygotes and direct the IVF program to (choose one): 
(b) Our frozen pre-zygotes may be examined by the IVF Program for 
biological studies and be disposed of by the IVF Program for 
approved research investigation as determined by the IVF Program. 
Id. at 176-77 (emphasis in original). 
129 Id. at 175, 176-77. 
130 Id. at 180. Similarly, other prior written directives, such as living 
YANGMACRO4-29.DOC 7/16/02  2:33 PM 
608 JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY 
general must be enforced to promote important policy goals.131 
First, the court found that advance directives encourage parties to 
think through possible consequences of their actions and to 
carefully detail their wishes in writing.132 Second, such 
expressions minimize ambiguity and “maximize procreative 
liberty by reserving to the progenitors the authority to make, 
what is in the first instance a quintessentially personal [and] 
private decision.”133 Third, having enforceable written 
agreements ensures the predictability and certainty necessary for 
the continuance of IVF programs.134 Lastly, the court recognized 
that if the public realizes and understands that courts will enforce 
such agreements, it underscores the “seriousness and integrity of 
the consent process.”135 
Although the Court of Appeals of New York strongly favors 
the use of written agreements,136 it suggested in a footnote that 
                                                          
wills and health care proxies, have been enforced. See, e.g., Cohen v. Bolduc, 
760 N.E.2d 714, 717-18 (Mass. 2002) (noting that “every State has enacted 
legislation permitting individuals to give advance directives for health care 
decisions should they become incapable of communicating their own wishes”); 
Jill Hollander, Note, Health Care Proxies: New York’s Attempt to Resolve the 
Right to Die Dilemma, 57 BROOK. L. REV. 145, 160 (1991) (finding that 
forty-two states and the District of Columbia have enacted statutes recognizing 
the validity of living wills, which are “[w]ritten directives to the family, 
physicians and hospital that life-prolonging treatment should not be 
administered in the event the person becomes incompetent”). 
131 Kass v. Kass, 696 N.E.2d 174, 180 (N.Y. 1998). 
132 Id. 
133 Id. 
134 Id. 
135 Id. The court recognized that all contracts dealing with some future 
event are difficult to deal with because they contemplate the unknown. Id. 
However, events such as death, divorce, and incapacity make it even more 
necessary for the court to uphold advance predisposition agreements since they 
reflect the parties’ intent before disputes erupt. “To the extent possible, it 
should be the progenitors—not the State and not the courts—who by their prior 
directive make this deeply personal life choice.” Id. at 180-81. 
136 Id. at 180 (agreeing with the Tennessee Supreme Court in Davis that 
agreements between progenitors should be enforced and that “[e]xplicit 
agreements avoid costly litigation in business transactions. They are all the 
more necessary and desirable in personal matters of reproductive choice, 
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had the appellant raised the claim that the agreement was invalid 
because of a significant change in circumstances, or that 
procreation was no longer desired, it would have been 
unenforceable as a violation of public policy.137 Although it is 
understandable for any court to refrain from making a per se 
rule, this court-created exception renders New York’s approach 
as to the enforceability of such contracts undeterminable.138 This 
footnote weakens what could have been a powerful position for 
the validity of advanced directives. Consequently, couples who 
have such covenants are still unable to predict whether their 
agreements are enforceable or binding. 
C. J.B. v. M.B.: Supreme Court of New Jersey, 2001 
In a recent New Jersey Supreme Court decision, the court 
reaffirmed the general consensus that agreements are valid in 
custody disputes over frozen preembryos despite finding the 
specific contract in the case to be invalid because of ambiguity.139 
In J.B. v. M.B., the wife, J.B., wanted to destroy the 
                                                          
where the intangible costs of any litigation are simply incalculable.”). 
137 Id. at 179 n.4 (stating that the “[p]arties’ agreement may, of course, 
be unenforceable as violative of public policy . . . . Significantly changed 
circumstances also may preclude contract enforcement.”). The court noted 
however, that since these particular arguments and issues were not argued by 
Maureen Kass, it would not resolve these outstanding issues in the current 
case. Id. 
138 This differs from the dictum in Davis, which allowed for modification 
of the contract by mutual accord. Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 597 
(Tenn. 1992). In Davis, the court presumably would enforce a pre-existing 
agreement between the parties despite changed circumstances in the absence of 
modification. Id. In contrast, the Kass court reserved the ability to declare a 
contract invalid if finding a change of circumstances or intentions. Kass, 696 
N.E.2d at 179 n.4. Thus, the Kass court was less deferential to the agreement 
between the parties. Arguably it was more deferential to the parties’ present 
intent, taking account of changed circumstances. The disposition of 
preembryos, however, is best left to the parties’ intentions manifested in an 
agreement that they can later modify, rather than the post facto judgment of a 
court. 
139 See J.B. v. M.B., 783 A.2d 707, 708 (N.J. 2001). 
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preembryos while the husband, M.B., urged the court to enforce 
the contract they made prior to IVF.140 The contract stated that if 
the couple divorced, all unused preembryos would be 
relinquished to the custody of the clinic unless there was a 
separate determination by the courts as to “who takes control and 
direction of the tissues.”141 In arguing for the validity of the 
agreement, M.B. insisted that it was the couple’s mutual desire to 
give the preembryos to the clinic so that they could be donated to 
an infertile couple.142 
While the intermediate appellate court held that any 
agreement between the parties to use or donate the preembryos 
would be unenforceable as a matter of public policy,143 the New 
Jersey Supreme Court found no clear agreement between the 
parties and the clinic as to the intended disposition of the 
preembryos.144 Since there was no clear demonstration as to the 
meaning of the agreement, the court concluded that the wife’s 
right to avoid procreation was stronger than the husband’s wish 
to donate145 and ordered the preembryos destroyed.146 The court 
                                                          
140 Id. at 710. 
141 Id. 
142 Id. Furthermore, in his cross-motion, M.B. claimed that, as Catholics, 
he and his wife had many long and serious conversations regarding the entire 
process, and it was their mutual intention to donate any unused preembryos to 
infertile couples. Id. 
143 J.B. v. M.B., 751 A.2d 613, 618 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2000) 
(holding that even if the agreement was unambiguous, the court would not 
compel one gamete donor to become a parent against his or her will and that 
“[a]s a matter of public policy . . . forced procreation is not an area amenable 
to judicial enforcement”). 
144 The court stated that “the thrust of the document signed by J.B. and 
M.B. is that the . . . Center obtains control over the preembryos unless the 
parties choose otherwise in a writing, or unless a court specifically directs 
otherwise in an order of divorce,” and that the agreement contained 
conditional language and thus, was ambiguous. J.B., 783 A.2d at 713. 
145 Id. at 717 (holding that because the husband retains the capacity to 
father children, “M.B.’s right to procreate is not lost if he is denied an 
opportunity to use or donate the preembryos . . . . We will not force J.B. to 
become a biological parent against her will.”); see also Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 
589 (holding that a husband’s right to avoid procreation outweighed a wife’s 
desire to donate the preembryos to an infertile couple). 
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further held that formal, unambiguous contracts adequately 
indicating the parties’ intentions are enforceable if each party 
maintains the right to change his or her mind about the terms of 
disposition in the future.147 The court, however, did not describe 
the elements of a disposition agreement that would adequately 
indicate the parties’ intention, nor did it specify sufficiently some 
of the public policy concerns that would invalidate such 
agreements. 
Although these three cases demonstrate that the highest state 
courts of Tennessee, New York, and New Jersey would likely 
enforce clear, unambiguous agreements regarding custody of 
frozen preembryos, many other states have yet to address this 
issue. This unpredictability as to the courts’ reaction to such 
agreements is exacerbated by the fact that other jurisdictions 
explicitly reject such contracts.148 As with many issues dealing 
with the intricacies of family law, courts may invalidate 
                                                          
146 J.B., 783 A.2d at 720. The court indicated that if M.B. chose to pay 
the cost of cryopreservation, it would allow the preembryos to be frozen 
indefinitely. Id. 
147 Id. Furthermore, although the court did not express an opinion as to 
situations in which a party who is no longer fertile seeks the use of the stored 
preembryos against the wishes of his or her partner, the court noted that 
adoption might be a consideration in future judicial determinations over the 
custody of frozen preembryos as an alternative to infertile individuals 
attempting to have children. Id. Not only is this concept fatally flawed but it 
also restricts one’s freedom to procreate. Although the law recognizes adopted 
children as having the same legal status as if they were biological, in this 
context, the possibility of having one’s own biological children by gaining 
custody of his or her frozen preembryos should not be equated with the 
possibility of adoption for various reasons. See, e.g., David L. Theyssen, 
Note, Balancing Interests in Frozen Embryo Disputes: Is Adoption Really a 
Reasonable Alternative?, 74 IND. L.J. 711, 724-29 (1999) (noting that 
adoption for many prospective parents can be difficult and can cost as much as 
IVF; hence, courts should not assume that a party may just adopt to achieve 
parenthood without sufficient evidence verifying the likelihood of this 
possibility). 
148 A.Z. v. B.Z., 725 N.E.2d 1051, 1051 (Mass. 2000) (holding that even 
if disposition agreements were clear and unambiguous, the court will not 
compel one to become a parent against his or her will as a matter of public 
policy). 
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agreements because of public policy.149 This should not, 
however, be taken to mean that the legislatures cannot design 
statutes that provide clear and informative model consent 
agreements. With such legislative actions, even if the courts 
invalidate agreements because of specific public policy conflicts, 
the agreement, at least, would not be void because of ambiguous 
terms. 
In fact, it would be more beneficial to the IVF industry if 
agreements were invalidated for public policy reasons rather than 
for ambiguous terms. Invalidating agreements because of public 
policy concerns gives clinics, attorneys, and IVF participants an 
understanding that contracts should not be used because the 
courts will not accept such arrangements. Voiding disposition 
agreements because of ambiguous terms or circumstances, 
however, as many courts have done, does little to provide 
guidance to future parties and still leaves open the question as to 
what constitutes an agreement that will be upheld by the courts.150 
Without direction from state laws as to the validity of such 
agreements or guidance as to an appropriate, enforceable 
contract, courts will continue to provide a non-uniform body of 
law. This lack of uniform guidance will continue until 
legislatures enact comprehensive statutes that will sufficiently 
maximize procreative rights and define the status of a preembryo. 
III. LEGISLATION 
Currently, the federal government minimally regulates the 
IVF industry.151 The existing regulations were drafted in response 
to public outcry for correct statistical data in Assisted 
                                                          
149 Shapiro, supra note 7, at 118. 
150 See, e.g., J.B., 783 A.2d at 714 (stating that “a formal, unambiguous 
memorialization of the parties’ intentions would be required to confirm their 
joint determination”). 
151 Meena Lal, Comment, The Role of the Federal Government in Assisted 
Reproductive Technologies, 13 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 
517, 533 (1997) (indicating that the Assisted Reproductive Technology 
Programs Act is the only federal act regulating the industry). 
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Reproductive Technology (“ART”) procedures,152 rather than as 
a result of congressional action. In the late 1980s, the general 
public expressed concern that some IVF clinics exaggerated their 
success rates.153 These allegations by IVF participants and critics 
eventually led Congress to pass the Fertility Clinic Success Rate 
and Certification Act of 1992.154 The act, among other things, 
requires clinics to report annually its pregnancy rates and 
authorizes the Center for Disease Control to develop and oversee 
certification procedures of IVF facilities.155 Despite the federal 
government’s attempt to protect IVF participants,156 the federal 
statute fails both to keep up with the growing advances in ART 
procedures and to address core ethical issues.157 In fact, the lack 
                                                          
152 Id. (noting that the federal act was enacted to require the reporting of 
success rates and for the development of a state-run certification program of 
embryo laboratories); see also Note, In Vitro Fertilization: Insurance and 
Consumer Protection, 109 HARV. L. REV. 2092, 2106 (1996) (noting that 
“[t]he number of clinical pregnancies achieved also matters to consumers 
because, by comparing that number to the number of live births, a woman can 
estimate her risk of experiencing the physical and emotional traumas of 
miscarriage”). 
153 Kenneth Baum, Golden Eggs: Towards the Rational Regulation of 
Oocyte Donation, 2001 BYU L. REV. 107, 124 (2001) (noting that the enacted 
laws merely provide for medical screening guidelines, clinical reports and 
insurance coverage guidelines). 
154 42 U.S.C. § 263 (2001). The act was proposed on November 26, 1991 
and passed on October 8, 1992. See H.R. REP. NO. 102-1096, at 26 (1992). 
The House report states that the purpose of the act is to “provide the public 
with comparable information on the effectiveness of infertility services and to 
assure the quality of these services by providing for the certification of embryo 
laboratories.” Id. 
155 See 42 U.S.C. § 263[a-1]–[a-7] (2001). 
156 By requiring the reporting of success rates, the enactment of the 
Assisted Reproductive Technology Programs Act protects the public from 
potentially misleading information from fertility laboratories and clinics about 
their statistics and ability to help infertile couples conceive. 
157 ART advances that have yet to be fully addressed by federal regulation 
include the following: (1) Gamete Intrafallopian Transfer (“GIFT”), where 
fertilization occurs in the body rather than in a laboratory as in IVF; (2) 
Zygote Intrafallopian Transfer (“ZIFT”), where the preembryos are placed 
directly into the fallopian tube; and (3) cryopreservation, the freezing and 
storage of bodily cells. See, e.g., Jean M. Eggen, The “Orwellian Nightmare” 
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of federal legislation regarding the legal status of frozen 
preembryos and the validity of predisposition contracts suggests a 
conscious decision by the federal government to avoid the issue. 
This failure has caused a great deal of discrepancy and 
inconsistency among the states.158 
The ART and IVF industries are subject to many different 
standards of compliance created by different statutory laws.159 
Statutes, such as those enacted in Louisiana160 and New 
Mexico,161 that protects preembryos create problems for the 
                                                          
Reconsidered: A Proposed Regulatory Framework for the Advanced 
Reproductive Technologies, 25 GA. L. REV. 625, 628-32, 635-37 (1991). 
158 Currently, nine states have enacted statutes that attempt to resolve 
some of the problems associated with IVF. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 742.17 (West 
2001) (requiring the commissioning couple and the treating physician to enter 
into a written agreement that provides for the disposition of the cells in the 
event of death, divorce, or other unforeseen circumstances); 720 ILL. COMP. 
STAT. 510/6(7) (2001) (providing that no person shall sell or experiment on a 
human ovum unless it is therapeutic to the fetus produced thereby); KAN 
STAT. ANN. § 65-6702 (2000) (allowing the use of any drug or device that 
prevents implantation of an embryo); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 311.715 
(Banks-Baldwin 2001) (prohibiting the use of public funds for IVF treatment if 
such procedures result in the intentional destruction of a human embryo); LA. 
REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:129 (West 2001) (providing that an in vitro fertilized 
human ovum exists as a juridical person and shall not be intentionally 
destroyed); MO. ANN. STAT. § 1.205(1) (West 2001) (providing that life 
begins at the moment of conception); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 168-B:1, 
B:13-16 (2001) (defining terms of eligibility for IVF treatment, limiting the 
usage of preembryos, and requiring the judicial pre-authorization of all written 
consent agreements); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 24-9A-[1]-[7] (Michie 2001) 
(stating that all preembryos created must be implanted); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 
18, § 3213 (2001) (providing for IVF reporting requirements). 
159 Andrews, supra note 79, at 406. Without clear, uniform laws among 
the states, physicians are reluctant to perform such procedures since it is 
uncertain whether they may be prosecuted for any subsequent loss of 
preembryos. See also Jadrnack, supra note 9 (noting that in New Mexico with 
“the absence of clear law, fertility clinics find themselves wondering exactly 
where their liability lies”). 
160 LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 9:126, 129 (West 2001) (finding that an in 
vitro fertilized human ovum exists as a juridical person and cannot be 
destroyed intentionally). 
161 N.M. STAT. ANN. § 24-9A-[1]-[7] (stating that all preembryos created 
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continued use of IVF.162 When left to create their own laws, 
states may create “vague duties for physicians or establish 
extremely high standards of care . . . [which] may make it 
unlikely that physicians will offer the techniques.”163 Louisiana’s 
statute making preembryos “juridical person[s],”164 for example, 
may deter specialists from even offering the most basic IVF 
procedure for fear of future prosecution by the state. 
On the otherhand, Florida’s statute is the antithesis of 
Louisiana and New Mexico’s implantation requirement. Florida 
allows for the destruction of preembryos and encourages parties 
to sign predisposition agreements prior to IVF in cases of 
divorce, death, or any other unforeseeable circumstances.165 If a 
written agreement is absent, the custody of the gametes will 
                                                          
must be implanted and thus cannot be intentionally destroyed). 
162 For example, the state of Illinois enacted a law providing that 
physicians who fertilized a woman’s egg outside her body “shall, [for 
purposes of an 1877 child abuse act] with regard to the human being thereby 
produced, be deemed to have the care and custody of a child.” Andrews, 
supra note 79, at 398. As one can imagine, this statute created great 
hindrances for IVF doctors in the state. Id. The main concern was that 
physicians were uncertain as to how the courts would interpret the extent of 
their care over the preembryos. Id. In an industry where simple procedures 
could potentially destroy an embryo, physicians were concerned that routine 
processes, such as the freezing and thawing of extra preembryos, would be 
considered a prosecutable offense. Id. 
163 Id. at 399-400. 
164 See supra note 34. “As a juridical person, the . . . ovum shall be given 
an identification by the medical facility . . . which entitles such ovum to sue or 
be sued.” LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:124. One author defines Louisiana’s 
“juridical person” status to preembryos as that which grants such cells the 
right to subsist; therefore, they cannot be intentionally destroyed. Kevin U. 
Stephens, Reproductive Capacity: What Does the Embryo Get? 24 S.U. L. 
REV. 263, 269 (1997). 
165 See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 742.17 (providing that “[a] commissioning 
couple and the treating physician shall enter into a written agreement that 
provides for the disposition of the commissioning couple’s eggs, sperm and 
preembryos in the event of a divorce, death of a spouse, or any other 
unforeseen circumstance”). See also KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-6702 
(complimenting the Florida statute in considering the disposal of preembryos 
lawful when the donors jointly decide it). 
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remain with the individual who provided them.166 In cases dealing 
with preembryos, decision-making authority regarding disposition 
must be based on the mutual consent of both parties.167 In 
addition to mandating predisposition agreements, Florida is the 
only state that has enacted legislation that explicitly recognizes 
the validity of these contracts.168 
Intervention by state legislatures to create some consistency 
and uniformity among the states is inevitable.169 Although some 
states have enacted their own statutes as a result of the absence of 
federal guidelines, many of these statutes differ greatly as to the 
definition of life, the rights and status of a preembryo, and the 
ability of IVF participants to choose the fate and disposition of 
their gametes.  
IV. ANALYSIS 
With only a vague line of U.S. Supreme Court cases 
addressing issues of abortion and the right to procreate (some 
dating back well over twenty years), and with virtually no 
guidance from the federal government, it is no surprise that the 
current state of the law over frozen preembryos is unsettled. 
Although some states have made a valiant attempt to address this 
issue by enacting their own legislation,170 statutes that mandate 
implantation, such as those in Louisiana and New Mexico, are 
problematic.171 The right to procreate is significant, and this 
dilemma can only be alleviated with contractual enforcement. 
Since contracts can be invalidated if they violate public policy 
                                                          
166 See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 742.17(1). 
167 See id. § 742.17(2). 
168 Coleman, supra note 32, at 74. 
169 Ellen Waldman, Disputing over Embryos: Of Contracts and Consents, 
32 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 897, 940 (2000) (arguing that the legislation be enacted to 
oversee the contracting process in order to achieve its assumed goal of 
enhancing procreative liberty). 
170 See discussion infra Part III (discussing and comparing the Florida, 
Louisiana, and New Mexico statutes). 
171 See discussion infra Part III (discussing why certain state statutes are 
problematic). 
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or constitutional principles, legislators should provide guidelines 
for appropriate disposition agreements. Advance disposition 
agreements provide individuals with the opportunity to set forth 
and establish their own personal interests, viewpoints, and ethics 
for either procreation or the avoidance of procreation. If statutes 
similar to Florida’s are enacted, the participants’ interests, as 
reflected by their agreement, would be the courts’ primary 
concern if litigation occurs. Advance directives, therefore, 
sidestep the need to classify preembryos as either persons or 
property. The court need only determine the circumstances and 
intent of the parties prior to signing the agreement.172 
Furthermore, only a statute such as Florida’s can withstand 
constitutional scrutiny because it does not force one to procreate 
against his or her will and ensures that prior agreements 
respecting the participants’ wishes are enforced. 
A. Mandatory Implantation Requirements Infringe on 
Procreative Rights 
Those states that mandate the implantation of preembryos 
generally perceive the cells as “persons.”173 Once the legal status 
of a preembryo is upgraded by statute to that of a “person,” a 
legitimate interest is created requiring the state’s protection.174 
Furthermore, mandatory preembryo donation may have 
considerable impact on IVF and may deter couples from 
participating in treatment altogether. This may rob them of their 
chance to ever reproduce.175 Louisiana’s statute mandating 
implantation or donation severely limits the choices available to 
the gamete providers.176 Furthermore, all options that are valid 
under Louisiana law have grave detrimental consequences for the 
                                                          
172 See Robertson, supra note 59, at 414. 
173 See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:129 (providing that an in vitro 
fertilized human ovum exists as a juridical person and shall not be 
intentionally destroyed); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 24-9A-[1]-[7] (stating that all 
preembryos created cannot be harmed and, thus, cannot be destroyed). 
174 Arado, supra note 15, at 252. 
175 See Andrews, supra note 79, at 400. 
176 LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:129. 
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participants. In Louisiana, the couple can either give up their 
preembryos for adoption and suffer the psychological burden of 
knowing that their biological children exist somewhere,177 or they 
can use all of their preembryos to avoid donation and incur a 
dangerous risk to the woman’s health if multiple pregnancies 
occur.178 
Although Louisiana’s statute holds that a preembryo exists as 
a “juridical person,”179 to bestow this legal status upon these cells 
is problematic under current caselaw. One concern is that even 
fetuses, which are more advanced and developed than 
preembryos,180 are not held to be persons under the United States 
Supreme Court decisions181 interpreting the Constitution182 or 
                                                          
177 Robertson, supra note 59, at 405. 
178 Id. See discussion infra note 224. 
179 See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:129 (West 2001). 
180 Once the zygote, a fertilized egg, is formed, it begins to divide and 
attaches itself to the uterine wall while it continues to divide for a period of 
eight weeks. See Stephens, supra note 164, at 266-67. Only after the main 
organs are developed has the preembryo become a fetus. See id. at 267. See 
also Joel N. Ephross, Note, In Vitro Fertilization: Perspectives on Current 
Issues, 32 JURIMETRICS J. 447, 459 (1992) (stating that “[a]n embryo may 
have a unique genetic identity, but lack the ‘cluster of features’ associated with 
a person; or, lack sufficient potential for development to be cognizant of 
independent protection”). 
181 See, e.g., Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 857 (1992) 
(holding that personal autonomy recognizes limits on governmental power to 
mandate medical treatment); City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reprod. 
Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416, 438 n.27 (1983) (holding that the state is free to 
require certain types of abortions to be performed only in hospitals); Roe v. 
Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 156-59 (1973) (noting that “no case could be cited that 
holds that a fetus is a person within the meaning of the Fourteenth 
Amendment”); Roe, 410 U.S. at 162 (stating that “the unborn have never been 
recognized in the law as persons in the whole sense”); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 
405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972) (stating that “[i]f the right of privacy means 
anything, it is the right of the individual, married or single, to be free from 
unwarranted government intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a 
person as the decision whether to bear or beget a child”). 
182 U.S. CONST. AMEND. XIV, § 1. The Fourteenth Amendment of the 
U.S. Constitution provides that no state shall “deprive any person of life, 
liberty, or property, without due process of law, nor deny to any person 
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” Id. 
YANGMACRO4-29.DOC 7/16/02  2:33 PM 
 FROZEN PREEMBRYO STATUTES 619 
among the scientific community.183 In Roe v. Wade, the Supreme 
Court specifically held that the state’s interest in potential life 
should only be considered from the point of viability.184 
Furthermore, scientific data supports the notion that pregnancy 
does not occur at the moment of conception but rather at the 
point when the preembryo attaches to the uterine wall.185 Under 
the Roe precedent, therefore, it is troubling that Louisiana’s 
statute deeming frozen preembryos as separate legal entities 
would withstand constitutional scrutiny since the preembryos are 
neither attached to a uterine wall nor within in a woman’s womb. 
Despite this troubling concept, however, statutes defining 
preembryos as “juridical persons” may be held constitutional 
since such laws are distinct from “right to abortion” cases.186 
Under current caselaw, states can define preembryos and fetuses 
as persons with protective rights so long as their interpretation 
does not interfere with a woman’s bodily integrity.187 Louisiana’s 
definition of a preembryo, therefore, may withstand 
constitutional scrutiny since frozen preembryos are not sustained 
in a woman’s body and will not trigger the privacy interests 
enunciated in Roe.188 
Statutes that define preembryos as persons and require 
mandatory implantation of cells interfere with a person’s 
procreative rights and thus, may offend the Fourteenth 
Amendment.189 The Supreme Court has held that procreation is 
                                                          
183 Roe, 410 U.S. at 153. 
184 Id. at 160. Viability is usually held to be the time when the fetus 
reaches twenty-eight weeks or about seven months. Id. 
185 Guzman, supra note 27, at 207. Since fetuses are not recognized as 
persons under the law, one must ask if a frozen preembryo within a glass tube, 
sustained only with the use of liquid nitrogen, can be recognized as an 
independent entity by any state or court. 
186 Rao, supra note 90, at 1479. 
187 Id. 
188 Melchoir, supra note 30, at 950 (noting that since frozen preembryos 
exist in petri dishes, “[t]he bodily integrity of the woman would not be 
breached if she were not allowed to destroy her frozen embryos as it would be 
if she were not allowed to have an abortion”). 
189 U.S. CONST. AMEND. XIV, § 1. See also Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 
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“fundamental”190 and “one of the basic civil rights of 
[persons].”191 To interfere with this right, therefore, requires a 
compelling state interest.192 Although disputes over frozen 
preembryos differ from the previous cases addressed by the 
Supreme Court, absent language or decisions to the contrary, 
there is no reason to suspect that the right to procreate or avoid 
procreation with respect to IVF violates the fundamental 
freedoms established by the Court. Directives that force couples 
to either use their preembryos or forfeit them for adoptive 
implantation restricts one’s freedom to procreate or avoid 
procreation.193 
Another problem with mandatory implantation statutes is that 
they “infringe on procreative rights of IVF participants without 
identifying an interest that the state seeks to protect.”194 To justify 
this interference with procreative liberties, the burden of proof is 
on the government to demonstrate that there is both the 
compelling need for the law and that the restriction is not overly 
broad.195 Although the state can argue that it has an interest in 
protecting life, this purported interest is not compelling under 
current caselaw or scientific opinions. It is not practical, 
moreover, since preembryos have not reached the minimum 
                                                          
(1973). 
190 Id. at 156. 
191 Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942) (holding that an 
Oklahoma statute that provided for the sterilization of criminals who were 
convicted more than two times for certain felonies was unconstitutional on the 
grounds of equal protection since convicted felons were not treated equally). 
192 See Roe, 410 U.S. at 155. The Court, citing Kramer v. Union Free 
Dist., 395 U.S. 621, 627 (1969), held that where fundamental rights are 
concerned, limiting these rights can only be justified by a “compelling state 
interest.” Id. 
193 See Clifton Perry & L. Kristen Schneider, Cryopreserved Embryos: 
Who Shall Decide Their Fate? 13 J. LEGAL MED. 463, 469-74 (1992) 
(providing a constitutional analysis of landmark cases that have established an 
individual’s right to procreate and avoid procreation). 
194 Cynthia Reilly, Constitutional Limits on New Mexico’s In Vitro 
Fertilization Law, 24 N.M. L. REV. 125, 128 (1994). 
195 See Andrews, supra note 79, at 400. 
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developmental stage necessary to constitute “life.”196 
Furthermore, statutes that require gamete providers to donate 
their preembryos to other couples for implantation serve as a dual 
infringement on procreative rights. If couples choose not to use 
their preembryos, not only must they relinquish their rights in 
determining the disposition of their own biological DNA, but also 
by mandating implantation, they face having a biological child 
carried and reared by a complete stranger. Mandated 
implantation requirements “place upon gamete providers the 
burden of knowing that they may have a living genetically related 
child.”197 This strikes at the very notion of individual rights and 
procreative freedom. This also may lead to great judicial 
inefficiencies when courts are constantly called upon to make ad 
hoc determinations regarding the best interest of the child in each 
and every case.198 
As the Tennessee Supreme Court noted, unlike a viable fetus 
in its mother’s womb who has an excellent chance of being 
brought to term and born alive, a preembryo that is transferred 
by IVF has only a 13% to 21% chance of achieving 
implantation.199 Even if implanted successfully, only 56% to 75% 
of these pregnancies result in live births.200 Moreover, despite the 
presumed statutory goal of maternal and fetal protection,201 
mandatory implantation may actually work to the detriment of 
                                                          
196 See Elizabeth G. Patterson, Human Rights and Human Life: An 
Uneven Fit, 68 TUL. L. REV. 1527, 1529, 1550 (1994) (“[A] human who has 
not yet been born, reached viability, or satisfied some other criterion for the 
beginning of life, is not considered a person in whom human rights 
inhere . . . . Traditionally, the law has not treated the fetus as a person.”). 
197 Elisa K. Poole, Comment, Allocation of Decision-Making Rights to 
Frozen Embryos, 4 AM. J. FAM. L. 67, 75 (1990). 
198 Bill E. Davidoff, Comment, Frozen Embryos: A Need for Thawing in 
the Legislative Process, 47 SMU L. REV. 131, 140 (1993). 
199 Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 595 n.19 (Tenn. 1992). 
200 Id. 
201 Bruce Nolan, LA Rejects OK on Embryo Tests, NEW ORLEANS TIMES-
PICAYUNE, Oct. 2, 1994, available at 1994 WL 3864404 (stating that 
“Louisiana law prohibits the production of embryos for any other purpose but 
creating a child”). 
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both beings.202 By substituting a physician’s individualized 
decision-making judgment as to the best interest of the woman 
with a legislative mandate, these statutes may harm the recipient 
by forcing the implantation of less suitable preembryos.203 In 
addition, the Supreme Court has recognized that the “full 
vindication of the woman’s fundamental right necessarily requires 
that her physician be given ‘the room he needs to make his best 
medical judgment.’”204 Without devising a mechanism for 
medical conventions, these statutes invite burdensome medical 
predicaments and may frustrate the established “medical 
protocol[s] designed to ensure the health of the mother or fetus 
that might discourage a physician from implanting every 
[pre]embryo.”205 Even though the state may require implantation, 
the possible risk of multiple gestations may “require a mother 
and her physician to abort some or all of the fetuses after the 
preembryos are implanted.”206 There is no doubt that such an 
occurrence would defeat the purpose of having a statute in the 
first place. 
Although Louisiana’s law seems to protect these “persons,” it 
does not provide clear guidelines for preembryos after they are 
donated.207 While adoption laws exist to guard the interests of 
children already born,208 states that mandate preembryo donation 
                                                          
202 Reilly, supra note 194, at 128. 
203 Stephens, supra note 164, at 269 (claiming that if Louisiana does not 
modify its position of treating preembryos as juridical persons, “modifications 
in the law need to be made to allow for . . . defective preembryos and other 
tort problems such as medical liability”). 
204 City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reprod. Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 
416, 427 (quoting Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 192 (1973)). 
205 Id. 
206 Id. 
207 LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:129. 
208 While there are agencies to protect adopted or foster children, it is 
unclear whether such precautions are taken to ensure that adoptive parents of 
frozen preembryos are providing safe and healthy environments for the 
resulting children. See, e.g., The New York State Department of Health, 
Adoption and Medical Information Registry, available at http://www.health. 
state.ny.us/nysdoh/vr/reginfo.htm (last visited Apr. 28, 2002) (stating that the 
web site provides three services that do the following: (1) help adoptees obtain 
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do not have similar protections to secure the interests of children 
conceived from anonymously donated preembryos.209 This lack of 
state legislation can have a severe impact on everyone involved. 
Issues such as unknown medical histories,210 possible abuse and 
                                                          
information about their birth parents; (2) facilitate the exchange of information 
between adoptees and their birth parents; and (3) enable adoptees to obtain 
medical information). While many states have agencies that oversee the 
process of adoption and provide services for adoptees to obtain crucial 
information about their medical history and past, there does not seem to be 
similar authorities for children born from donated preembryos. To adopt a 
child in New York State, adoptive parents must meet certain conditions, obtain 
consent from appropriate authorities, and comply with general provisions 
relating to adoptions. See New York State Bar Association, Adoption in New 
York, available at http://www.nysba.org/public/ pamphlets/adoption.html (last 
visited Apr. 28, 2002). There are no similar precautions and monitoring 
authorities established for donated preembryos. 
209 See, e.g., N.M. STAT. ANN. § 32A-5-[2] & [3] (2001) (establishing a 
framework for child protection, economic security and legal equivalency for 
adoptive children but defining an “adoptee” as “a person who is the subject of 
an adoption petition”). Frozen preembryos given to surrogate parents are not 
within the definition of “adoptee” under the act, and, thus, they do not seem 
to be protected under New Mexico adoption laws. 
210 In addition to the possibility of intermarriage, most preembryos will be 
adopted and carried to term anonymously. See Heidi Forster, The Legal and 
Ethical Debate Surrounding the Storage and Destruction of Frozen Human 
Embryos: A Reaction to the Mass Disposal in Britain and the Lack of Law in 
the United States, 76 WASH. U. L.Q. 759, 760 (1998) (noting that one option 
for fertility clinics is to give the preembryos anonymously to other couples 
who carry them to gestation). Thus, adoptive parents would most likely not 
have knowledge of the child’s biological lineage or medical history. This may 
pose serious medical concerns for the child in the future. Dennis J. Doherty, 
Frozen Embryos: The Birth of a Legal Controversy, 65 WIS. LAW. 15, 17 
(1992) (noting that states could apply their adoption framework to cases of 
frozen preembryos so that such precautions and genetic relations could be 
recorded to resolve potential problems). Without knowledge of the child’s 
propensity for inheritable disorders, physicians and the child’s surrogate 
parents are not in the best position to make medical decisions on their behalf. 
Id. Although this lack of knowledge is true even in traditional adoptions, with 
the issue of mandatory adoption of frozen preembryos, the state can rectify 
this potential problem by making allowances for the disclosure of medical 
background information of the gamete providers prior to them giving up their 
preembryos for adoption. Unfortunately, it appears that these statutes do not 
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neglect by unfit surrogate parents,211 the increased number of 
dispersed biological siblings,212 and the possibility of 
intermarriage213 or incest214 are all questions that the statutes of 
Louisiana and New Mexico are ill-prepared to address. 
The possibility for abuse and neglect, moreover, may be 
magnified in states where couples are required to donate their 
preembryos to surrogate parents who have not been effectively 
screened.215 For example, in one tragic occurrence in 
Pennsylvania, a bachelor, James Austin, hired a surrogate mother 
to carry his child.216 The Infertility Center of America (“ICA”) 
matched Austin with a surrogate who was impregnated with his 
                                                          
make such authorizations or considerations before forcing these couples to 
donate. 
211 See, e.g., Huddleston v. Infertility Ctr. of Am., 700 A.2d 453 (Pa. 
Super. Ct. 1997) (holding that the surrogate mother did have standing to sue 
for the wrongful death of her newborn even though she was paid by the baby’s 
father, a bachelor, to carry his child to term). 
212 Unlike sperm banks that have enacted policies to reduce the possibility 
of multiple children from one donor by setting limits to the number of children 
a donor can father or mandating that his sperm not be released to a woman 
within the same area, there are no visible safeguards for adopted preembryos. 
See, e.g., Rainbow Flag Health Service, Known Donor Insemination, 
available at http://www.gayspermbank.com (last visited Apr. 28, 2002) 
(claiming that its sperm bank limits the use of donor sperm to impregnate only 
four women). See also The Sperm Bank of NY, Inc., Become a BioGenetics 
Exclusive Donor, available at http://www.sperm1.com (last visited Apr. 28, 
2002) (limiting the number of pregnancies from a specific sperm donor to two 
per state in non-anonymous donations). As such, it may be possible for women 
in the same county or even town to implant and gestate biological siblings 
without knowledge or consideration of the possible future ramifications. 
Furthermore, it seems none of the states keep records tracking how many 
“sibling” preembryos are implanted and result in births. This lack of clear 
precautions and data keeping opens the door to the possibility of incest and 
familial strains upon all persons involved. 
213 Andrews, supra note 16, at 80-83. 
214 Id. 
215 See, e.g., supra note 208. 
216 Huddleston v. Infertility Ctr. of Am., 700 A.2d 453 (Pa. Super. Ct. 
1997). 
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sperm.217 An ICA representative even accompanied Austin when 
he went to the delivery room to claim his newborn son.218 Austin, 
in addition, received counseling and assistance from the clinic 
that matched him with the surrogate. Despite these efforts, 
Austin killed the newborn shortly after its birth.219 
States with mandatory implantation statutes value preembryos 
as “persons” and believe that such restrictions would result in 
born life.220 Given the current state of abortion laws in this 
country221 and the lack of demand for donated preembryos,222 
Louisiana’s goal to promote life by mandating implantation seems 
futile.223 If a couple in Louisiana or New Mexico wishes to 
destroy the preembryos rather than donate them, they can 
exercise their right to implant the preembryos and subsequently 
terminate the pregnancy by a legal abortion.224 Moreover, couples 
                                                          
217 Id. 
218 Id. at 456. 
219 Id. at 455. 
220 Nolan, supra note 201. 
221 As with the right to procreate, there is an equally large number of 
cases supporting the notion of the right to avoid procreation. See, e.g., 
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (holding that a Connecticut 
statute prohibiting the use of contraceptives was unconstitutional because it 
invaded the privacy rights of married couples); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 
438 (1972) (extending the holding of Griswold to establish the right to privacy 
for unmarried couples); Carey v. Population Servs. Int’l, 431 U.S. 678, 687 
(1977) (holding that “[r]ead in light of its progeny, the teaching of Griswold is 
that the Constitution protects individual decisions in matters of childbearing 
from unjustified intrusions by the State”). 
  In Roe, the Court found that this right extended to include abortion 
decisions. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). In expanding privacy rights to 
include the right of abortion, the Court considered the negative consequences 
that would result should the right to terminate an unwanted pregnancy be 
infringed by the government. Id. at 153. This reasoning supports the notion 
that the right not to procreate should be respected by the government and that 
the state’s interest in the potential life of preembryos is insufficient to justify 
forced adoptive implantation. See supra Part IV.A. 
222 Coleman, supra note 32, at 64. 
223 Nolan, supra note 201. 
224 Although this situation is highly impractical and unlikely to occur, this 
scheme is perfectly permissible and legal under Louisiana and New Mexico 
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can simply go to a different jurisdiction where the restrictions 
and regulations are better suited to their own principles to 
undergo IVF. Whatever minimal interest the state has in potential 
life is further undermined by the low probability that the birth of 
a child would result by the prohibition on abandonment.225 Thus, 
it is not clear that retaining these preembryos for donation will 
accomplish the state’s goal in yielding more births. Given all 
these deterrents, it seems that the goal of encouraging new life is 
futile.226 
B. Benefits of Advance Disposition Agreements 
As an alternative to the harsh statutes of Louisiana and New 
Mexico, the Florida statute mandating the validity and use of 
disposition agreements provides the best means for resolving 
some of the most difficult disputes over frozen preembryos. 
Enforcing such agreements provides maximum procreative 
liberty and ensures that IVF participants fully consider the 
ramifications of their actions. As long as couples have the ability 
to modify the agreement whenever they change their minds, the 
contract should be valid and enforced. 
There are some courts227 as well as scholars228 who believe 
that advance disposition agreements should not be enforced 
                                                          
state laws and would allow couples to circumvent inane mandatory 
implantation requirements. 
225 See Guzman, supra note 27, at 219. 
226 See Coleman, supra note 32, at 64. 
227 See, e.g., J.B. v. M.B., 783 A.2d 707, 708 (N.J. 2001) (holding that 
even if the husband and wife had entered into an unambiguous agreement 
regarding their frozen preembryos, because it is against public policy, the 
agreement would not be enforced); A.Z. v. B.Z., 725 N.E.2d 1051, 1059 
(Mass. 2000) (holding that the court would not enforce an agreement that 
would compel one donor to become a parent against his or her will as a matter 
of public policy). 
228 See Coleman, supra note 32, at 57; see also Note, Rumpelstiltskin 
Revisited: The Inalienable Rights of Surrogate Mothers, 99 HARV. L. REV. 
136, 1941 (1986) (noting that “[b]ecause the law permits different methods of 
disposal for different rights, courts cannot rely on some imagined internal 
structure or logic in a system of rights to deduce inalienability”). 
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because they violate public policy or infringe upon one’s freedom 
to procreate.229 Many argue that because advance agreements are 
decided prior to IVF, they should not be binding upon individuals 
who subsequently change their minds as to the disposition method 
originally selected.230 Although the individual’s circumstances 
and state of mind prior to and after IVF may drastically change, 
human indecisiveness and uncertainty are variables in any 
contract.231 While individuals may be indecisive about the 
disposition of their frozen preembryos, this issue requires 
prudent decision-making and predictability. As with every 
contract, individuals should understand the terms of the 
agreement and anticipate possible circumstances.232 Divorce, 
death of the participants, and the possibility of future infertility 
are all conceivable situations, and the effect of these events can 
be provided for in a written agreement. Contracting encourages 
potential parents to consider these possibilities and decide 
disposition issues prior to creating preembryos or dissolving the 
relationship. 
Furthermore, courts have enforced agreements within the 
familial setting.233 Like antenuptial agreements234 or divorce 
stipulations, disposition agreements provide individuals with 
                                                          
229 See Coleman, supra note 32, at 66 (arguing that such disposition 
agreements are unenforceable because they attempt to restrict rights that are 
inalienable). 
230 See id. 
231 Susan B. Apel, Disposition of Frozen Embryos: Are Contracts the 
Solution?, 27 VER. B.J. & L. DIG. 29, 32 (2001). 
232 Id. at 31-32. 
233 Id. at 32. 
234 Id. An antenuptial agreement is defined as follows: 
A written contract between two people who are about to marry, 
setting out the terms of possession of assets, treatment of future 
earnings, control of the property of each, and potential division if the 
marriage is later dissolved. These are fairly common if either or both 
parties have substantial assets, children from a previous marriage, 
potential large inheritances, high incomes, or have been “taken” by a 
prior spouse. 
Law.Com Dictionary, available at http://dictionary.law.com (last visited Apr. 
28, 2002). 
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predictability and assurance that prior consensus will be honored. 
Although antenuptial agreements and divorce stipulations focus 
on establishing economic stability and certainty while disposition 
agreements address more personal issues, both types of 
agreements carry similar psychological, emotional, and financial 
burdens. Much like any other binding agreement pertaining to 
one’s personal life, an advance disposition contract will always 
be emotional and difficult. 
Despite the possible stress of executing such agreements on 
couples, contracts determining the disposition of the preembryos 
provide them with relief from the current state of legal limbo. 
The benefits of contractual agreements in relation to frozen 
preembryos are multifold. First, contractual agreements set out a 
coherent legal framework for participants in which they can 
address the possibilities and circumstances that may occur as a 
result of creating preembryos. Florida’s statute recognizing the 
validity of such agreements allows people to conform their 
conduct to the rules set out by the legislature beforehand and, if 
the rules are not to their liking, to forgo IVF altogether.235 
Second, agreements permit couples to decide the fate of their 
gametes in a way that conforms to their personal feelings and 
beliefs. Florida’s statute, which requires couples to decide the 
fate of their preembryos before they are created,236 ensures that 
the parties discuss issues that are of personal significance to them 
and guarantees that the contract best reflects their concerns. 
Agreements ensure that the individual progenitor’s values and 
beliefs are incorporated into the agreement from the beginning. 
By enforcing agreements, advance directives also reduce the 
possibility that the parties will be forced to accept a never-
anticipated result since both parties provided consent. This 
mutual agreement should be respected and enforced by the state 
and the courts rather than be taken apart and scrutinized by third 
parties unrelated to the dispute or concerns of the parties 
involved. 
Third, advance disposition agreements promote practicality 
                                                          
235 Apel, supra note 231, at 32. 
236 Id. 
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and efficiency. By encouraging IVF participants to sign 
enforceable agreements, courts would no longer be called upon 
each time a dispute arises. When a dispute occurs without an 
agreement in place, not only will one party lose custody of the 
preembryos, but everyone involved will be forced to pay legal 
fees and await judicial appeals.237 While the caselaw on such 
disputes is inadequate to address these issues, statutes are the best 
means to resolve potential conflicts and promote judicial 
efficiency. In order to maximize the benefits of the agreements, 
IVF participants must have assurances from the legislature and 
the courts that the agreements will be valid and enforceable. If 
statutes explicitly mandate advance contracts and provide for 
their enforceability, there will be fewer disputes over frozen 
preembryos.238 Because frozen preembryos are unique and can 
have great impact on the lives of the parties involved, the need 
for greater legislative guidance and enforcement is compelling. 
V. PROPOSAL 
The federal legislature’s lack of guidance regarding frozen 
preembryo disposition has forced the states to address this issue, 
creating uncertain and inconsistent results nationwide.239 This 
lapse in the interpretation of state law is the greatest threat to the 
IVF industry, forcing physicians and participants to wonder about 
the legality of their actions and the disposition of their genes.240 
Having familial disputes resolved before gestation to ensure a 
consistent and stable environment for future growth and 
development benefits preembryos. Laws mandating their 
disposition, therefore, are important to provide individuals with 
proper notice as to the potential liabilities that may arise from 
their actions and to establish a stable home environment for a 
child conceived by IVF. 
                                                          
237 Id. 
238 Id. 
239 See id. 
240 See discussion supra note 162 (discussing instances where physicians 
are unclear as to the legal implications of IVF and its processes). 
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The primary reason for the need to clarify legal parentage 
before birth is to ensure that there is a secure home for the child. 
The current law regarding legal parentage of preembryos created 
by ARTs poses danger to a child because it leaves the question of 
who his or her parents are unanswered. The confusion over who 
has the decision-making authority and responsibility for the child 
is the most significant risk. Establishing clear legal parentage is 
important in defining the relationship between the child, donors, 
surrogate mothers, and the intended rearing parents. Despite the 
desperate situation with regard to frozen preembryos in the law, 
the federal government has still refused to tackle these issues. 
Although states have enacted their own statutes, many of these 
laws are constitutionally questionable.241 
Florida’s approach to this debate is the best solution because 
it encourages prudent decision-making and would give the gamete 
providers predictability.242 This approach ensures that neither 
party will be forced to sustain a highly unanticipated or greatly 
compromised outcome. By allowing couples to choose whether to 
carry the preembryo to term or to destroy it, the Florida statute 
maximizes procreative freedom by giving decision-making 
authority to the individuals who provided the gametes.243 
Florida’s statute appropriately gives IVF participants this 
authority, as they are directly affected by any resulting 
disposition of the preembryos.244 
Although Florida’s statute is the best statute currently 
available, some amendments could be incorporated. First, to 
                                                          
241 See supra Part III (discussing certain state statutes that may be 
constitutionally questionable because they overly restrict one’s right to 
procreate). 
242 See supra note 7 (noting that such agreements would enable the couple 
to determine the disposition of their cells). 
243 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 742.17 (West 2001). This mutual agreement, 
solidified in a written agreement, ensures that the preembryos will be disposed 
of in a manner consistent with both progenitors’ wishes. 
244 See Eggen, supra note 157, at 700 (noting that the intervention of third 
parties “causes the donor couple to relinquish at least a portion of their interest 
in reproductive privacy, as their preembryos no longer will be used for their 
own procreation”). 
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prevent possible incest or intermarriage, statutes attempting to 
provide legislative guidance should also provide for confidential 
record keeping in preembryo adoption. Gamete providers should 
provide their names and any other relevant medical history to the 
state for recordation. Second, proper monitoring agencies should 
be established to ensure that adoptive parents are mentally, 
physically, and financially fit to carry preembryos to term and 
beyond. This would include updating or amending any existing 
adoption laws currently in place to include and protect the 
children born from adopted preembryos. In addition, the donative 
parents should be relieved of all the parental and financial 
responsibilities for the resulting child. Third, the legislation 
should mandate the signing of disposition agreements to 
determine the control of these preembryos upon divorce, death, 
and other possibilities. This would also require the legislation to 
provide model consent agreements with clear, unambiguous 
terms for clinics and IVF participants to follow. 
Another concern is the possibility that one spouse becomes 
infertile and may need the preembryos to procreate. In Davis, 
although the Tennessee Supreme Court was opposed to forced 
procreation, it carved out an exception for those who could not 
have biological children without the use of the frozen 
preembryos.245 Although advance directives allow couples to plan 
for future infertility, courts may still be uneasy about invalidating 
such agreements knowing that the individual can only have 
biological children through IVF. As a revision to Florida’s 
statute, this note proposes an amendment requiring clinics to 
divide sperm so that some of these gametes are frozen in their 
independent state while the rest are used to create preembryos. 
Because sperm can be stored safely in the frozen state while eggs 
cannot,246 an infertile man would have the opportunity to have 
                                                          
245 Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 604 (Tenn. 1992). The Tennessee 
Supreme Court held that if an agreement was available, it should be adhered 
to. Id. If no agreement exists however, the courts should weigh the interests of 
the parties regarding the use of the preembryos. Id. Unless the party does not 
have a reasonable opportunity to become a parent without using the 
preembryos, generally, the party wishing to avoid procreation will prevail. Id. 
246 See Guzman, supra note 27, at 219. 
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biological children without using the frozen preembryos and 
without infringing on the woman’s right to avoid procreation. 
Although this is only effective if the man is rendered infertile, 
this simple procedure would at the very least ensure that 
disposition agreements would be upheld in these particular 
situations. If the man has agreed to destroy the preembryos upon 
divorce and later becomes infertile, the contract could still be 
honored since the man can always access his frozen sperm to 
procreate with a willing participant. 
States should also require informed consent and counseling 
for all potential IVF participants. This would ensure that the 
participants know both the benefits and risks of ARTs so that 
they are able to make appropriate treatment decisions. 
Counseling would educate individuals about the serious 
implications of these procedures, such as the psychological stress 
of infertility treatment,247 its success rates,248 any religious or 
ethical concerns,249 the possibility of multiple pregnancies,250 and 
the possible need for selective reduction.251 Informed consent and 
counseling ensure that participants are educated about the 
psychological commitments and ramifications of the treatment 
they are considering. Both encourage thought and reflection by 
the couple and may potentially indicate to the individuals whether 
they are good candidates, emotionally and psychologically, for 
ARTs. On a similar note, a brief waiting period prior to IVF 
                                                          
247 Lori B. Andrews & Lisa Douglass, Symposium on Biomedical 
Technology and Health Care: Social and Conceptual Transformations, 65 S. 
CAL. L. REV. 623, 630 (1991) (stating that some clinicians have even 
recommended that couples undergo psychological counseling as part of 
infertility treatment). 
248 Id. 
249 Ephross, supra note 180, at 450 (noting that counseling helps couples 
to cope with the stress that may arise from their ethical and cultural 
backgrounds). 
250 Mary V. Rorty & Joann V. Pinkerton, Elective Fetal Reduction: The 
Ultimate Elective Surgery, 13 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 53, 64 
(1996) (noting that with infertility treatments, there is a great chance that 
multiple pregnancies may occur, forcing couples to contemplate the possibility 
of selective reduction). 
251 Id. 
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should also be encouraged by the states so that the parties can 
ponder and reflect on their agreement and still have the 
opportunity to modify or reconsider aspects of their contract 
before IVF.252 As one author notes, “it is the function of adequate 
counseling and some common sense, to assist people to make the 
best decisions possible, even under what some may view as less 
than ideal circumstances.”253 
CONCLUSION 
Although courts and scholars have been unable to agree on 
the future of frozen preembryos, there is uniform consensus that 
legislation needs to be enacted to alleviate the current state of 
confusion. While the federal government has failed to keep up 
with the growing advances in reproductive technologies, states 
have acted to provide direction. With little caselaw and guidance 
from the legislatures, however, these statutes do little to address 
the underlying concerns and issues brought forth by frozen 
preembryos.254 Disposition agreements should be recognized 
because they encourage thoughtful decision-making and preserve 
the intent of the IVF participants.255 Moreover, a model consent 
agreement should be provided to the participants. 
Although courts are free to invalidate an agreement if it 
                                                          
252 The success of waiting periods in other controversial areas has been 
well documented. For example, state imposed waiting periods have resulted in 
a greater number of gun permit rejections, since local authorities have more 
time to conduct thorough background checks on applicants. William 
Recktenwald & Jan Crawford, Brady Bill Not As Tough As 25-Year-Old 
Illinois Gun Law, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 23, 1993, at A1, A8. A waiting period of 
two-years before marriage has been recommended for covenant marriages. A 
study found that out of 700 Louisiana couples who were married in 1999, half 
of them in covenant marriages, only 25% of those who had waiting periods 
divorced. Marilyn Serafini, Get Hitched, Stay Hitched, NAT’L J., Mar. 9, 
2002, available at 2002 WL 7094794. 
253 Apel, supra note 231, at 32. 
254 Hopefully, with more states enacting statutes to deal with this issue, 
the varying laws will compel the federal government to finally address this 
matter and provide some clarity. 
255 Robertson, supra note 59, at 414. 
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violates public policy, a model agreement will prevent 
unenforceability because of ambiguous terms. If invalidation of 
an agreement should occur, it is more beneficial that the 
agreement be held unenforceable because it violates a specific 
public policy concern as opposed to being held invalid for 
ambiguity. Violation of public policy informs participants that 
such agreements would not be upheld. If a court decides that the 
terms of the agreement are ambiguous, however, it is unclear as 
to what would make an agreement valid or unambiguous and 
whether the courts would accept such agreements. Presenting a 
model consent agreement would reduce the burden on the courts 
to determine the legality of the contract terms. Courts could just 
look to the agreement and determine its implication on public 
policy. 
Mandatory implantation, moreover, should be avoided 
because it is constitutionally questionable and invokes a slew of 
problems and concerns. Other states should recognize the 
superiority of Florida’s statute and adopt a similar framework 
with some revisions for the regulation of ART and IVF 
procedures. The advances made in ARTs and IVF cannot be 
expected to keep pace with the federal government’s sluggishness 
in enacting regulations to provide guidance in this area. Hence, it 
is time for the state legislature to provide the public and the 
courts with clear direction as to the future of this scientific field. 
Only with responsible action by legislatures can this ambiguous 
array of caselaw and statutes ever be amended and rectified. 
 
